Executive Summary
As the war in Ukraine drags on, Azerbaijan and Turkey have emerged as key players in Europe’s strategy to diversify away from Russian energy. However, the prospect of a Russia–Ukraine ceasefire raises questions about the sustainability of Azerbaijan’s competitive advantage as a major alternative energy supplier to Europe.
This paper analyzes the likely outcomes of such a ceasefire on Azerbaijan’s energy export position and provides recommendations to strengthen its long-term strategic role.
1. Background and Context
Since 2022, the European Union has drastically reduced its reliance on Russian energy. In this vacuum, Azerbaijan, via Turkey, has gained prominence through the Southern Gas Corridor (SGC), particularly the TANAP and TAP pipelines. Strategic alignment between Baku and Ankara has turned the region into a vital energy bridge between the Caspian and Europe.
With talk of a potential ceasefire or negotiated settlement between Russia and Ukraine, the geopolitical landscape may shift again. The key question is whether Europe’s pivot away from Russian gas is temporary or represents a long-term structural change.
2. Scenarios of a Ceasefire Impact
Scenario A: Partial Normalization with Russia
Russia regains partial access to European energy markets. EU countries with strong industrial bases (e.g., Germany, Italy) may pressure for re-engagement. Azerbaijan’s market share could stagnate or decline. Long-term projects like the expansion of SGC may face funding slowdowns.
Scenario B: Political Ceasefire but Enduring Distrust
EU maintains strategic diversification despite peace. Azerbaijan continues to be viewed as a long-term hedge against Russian dominance. Turkey strengthens its role as a regional energy hub. The Middle Corridor project gains strategic importance.
Scenario C: Full Re-engagement with Russia
Unlikely in the short term due to deep political distrust. Would severely weaken Azerbaijan’s competitive position unless alternative advantages are consolidated now.
3. Strategic Advantages of Azerbaijan (Even Post-Ceasefire)
Geographic neutrality in European-Russian tensions Close alliance with Turkey, a NATO member and EU energy partner Access to Caspian and Central Asian gas (e.g., via Turkmenistan) Perceived political stability and reliability compared to Middle East or North Africa routes Support from EU in past agreements
(e.g., 2022 memorandum doubling gas exports)
4. Risks and Constraints
Russia’s potential to apply geopolitical pressure in the South Caucasus Infrastructure limitations in capacity and interconnectivity Competing routes and suppliers, including LNG from the U.S. or Qatar Potential instability in Karabakh or Armenia-Azerbaijan normalization process
5. Policy Recommendations
For Azerbaijan:
Accelerate infrastructure expansion (TANAP, TAP, and interconnectors to Balkan states) Diversify partners by including Central Asian gas via the Caspian Strengthen energy diplomacy with key EU stakeholders Invest in green transition technologies to align with EU long-term goals
For the EU:
Institutionalize long-term agreements with Azerbaijan and Turkey Support regional stability mechanisms in the South Caucasus Include Azerbaijan in strategic dialogue on energy security and decarbonization Invest in Middle Corridor logistics and energy infrastructure
6. Conclusion
Even in the event of a Russia–Ukraine ceasefire, Europe’s strategic imperative to avoid overdependence on Russian energy is unlikely to fade.
Azerbaijan, in close coordination with Turkey, must act now to consolidate its role as a reliable, long-term supplier of natural gas and possibly green energy to Europe.
This opportunity, shaped by crisis, can become a permanent geopolitical advantage—if backed by foresight, investment, and diplomacy.