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Saudi Arabia, by transferring 500 billion dollars from the mega Noam project to artificial intelligence, has taken a major step in redefining its developmental strategy. This transformation is linked with the decline in oil prices and economic challenges in the region. Such a focus not only points to the development of AI technology and infrastructure, but also places fundamental importance on how artificial intelligence will be exploited in the future.
The sharp decrease in oil prices and the drop in traditional energy revenues have forced the Saudi government to diversify and strengthen its economy. With the relative slowdown of the Noam project, it seems that Saudi Arabia is implementing a new concept of development, based on soft power and modern technologies.
Saudi Arabia and the UAE, as leaders of AI technology in the Middle East, have managed to attract significant investment, talent, and infrastructure. The dominance of these two countries in AI can redefine the distribution of regional power in the medium and long term, as smart tools transform not only the economy, but also security, education, health, and urban management.
Success in artificial intelligence is not limited to infrastructure and technology; rather, planning for its strategic applications will be the true determinant of power. The massive investment is only the beginning; countries that succeed in creating an AI ecosystem, formulating digital governance policies, and growing related industries, will have a stronger influence on the region’s future developments.
According to analysts, the serious entry of Saudi Arabia and the UAE into the field of artificial intelligence lays the ground for fundamental changes in the regional power structure, especially as dependence on oil and the traditional economy decreases. In the medium and long term, AI can redefine the dynamics of regional power, provided that leading countries can pursue innovation, education, and smart policymaking in parallel with infrastructural developments move by Saudi Arabia marks a shift from a resource-based economy to a knowledge-based and digital economy, which can completely transform the region’s strategic equations.

In this regard, taking into consideration of US and China competition in AI techs in the region is vital to understand the possibility of new domination.

Hamid Zarei

2025-10-25

Hamid Zarei

2025-08-19

President Masoud Pezeshkian’s recent visit to Yerevan served as a litmus test for Iran’s “positive balance” regional policy. The trip carried multiple dimensions—from trade and infrastructure to geopolitics—signaling Tehran’s intent to strengthen ties with Armenia while shaping the evolving order in the South Caucasus.

During the visit, Iran and Armenia signed 10 cooperation agreements ranging from economic to political fields. Key projects included the Persian Gulf–Black Sea corridor, construction of a second bridge over the Aras River, modernization of border checkpoints, and the third power transmission line to expand gas-for-electricity swaps. These steps not only solidify Tehran–Yerevan ties but also serve as a strategic response to the recent Armenia–Azerbaijan–Washington peace agreement, pushing Iran’s vision beyond the Caucasus toward the Black Sea.

Tehran’s focus on the Persian Gulf–Black Sea corridor reflects its ambition to join regional transit networks and counterbalance the Middle Corridor. However, the effectiveness of this strategy depends on cooperation with Armenia, Georgia, and Russia—and must contend with China’s heavy investment in alternative routes (the Northern and Maritime Corridors). While Iran seeks a foothold in the regional logistics map, it faces limitations in shifting large volumes of goods away from established corridors.

The geopolitical backdrop is equally important. Tehran’s emphasis on sovereignty and non-interference is also a subtle pushback against the Zangezur corridor narrative, while the absence of a presidential visit to Baku underscores Iran’s cautious stance toward Azerbaijan, whose policies are closely aligned with Turkey, the U.S., and Europe. Relying exclusively on an Iran–Armenia–Russia axis without pragmatic engagement with Baku and Ankara risks leaving Tehran with limited dividends.

In the end, Pezeshkian’s Yerevan trip highlighted both opportunities and constraints. It reaffirmed Iran’s balancing role, yet also exposed the gap between geopolitical ambitions and geo-economic realities. For Iran, breaking free from rigid bloc politics and adopting a more flexible, pragmatic regional approach will be key to converting diplomatic symbolism into tangible strategic gains.

Hamid Zarei

2025-08-18

Diplomacy has always shown its value — before, during, and after wars. Today, the United States’ renewed effort to mediate peace in Ukraine is a reminder that power is not only military but also diplomatic, economic, and political.

The recent Alaska summit and Washington gathering, brought the U.S., European leaders, Ukraine, and even Russia into the same framework of dialogue. While no ceasefire has yet been declared — and Kyiv faces growing pressure to accept tough conditions — the very fact that negotiations have started is a breakthrough.

Two issues dominate the talks:

Security guarantees for Ukraine

and Territorial concessions.

At its core, the debate resembles a trade-off: land in exchange for security. Moscow, however, rejects the presence of NATO peacekeepers, complicating the search for a sustainable deal.

Geopolitically, Russia negotiates from a position of strength, using its territorial control as leverage. At the same time, the Kremlin maintains close contact with allies — particularly China — to avoid isolation. Yet, China’s formal absence from the peace process is striking, given its status as a permanent UN Security Council member. While Beijing once engaged in shuttle diplomacy and even proposed a peace plan in 2023, it was largely sidelined. Today, China is occasionally mentioned as a potential security guarantor, though still informally.

What This Means for Global Actors

The U.S. is testing its global leadership, showing that it can manage crises not only through force but also through diplomacy. This could become a benchmark for how Washington handles conflicts in an increasingly multipolar world. Europe views peace as essential to its own security and energy diversification. However, divisions remain between Eastern European hardliners and Western pragmatists, complicating a unified stance. China is deliberately silent. By staying in the background, it preserves flexibility — keeping ties with Moscow while leaving the door open to return later, especially in reconstruction and investment. Russia seeks to lock in gains. By refusing NATO’s role as guarantor, it reinforces its red lines while leaning on support from China and parts of the Global South to balance Western pressure.

Looking Ahead

Short-term: No durable ceasefire, but provisional steps such as humanitarian corridors and limited security assurances.

Medium-term: A “frozen conflict” with de facto territorial concessions, echoing past precedents in Georgia (2008) or Crimea (2014).

Long-term: Either a comprehensive land-for-security deal or the emergence of a new European security architecture,

Final Thought

A lasting peace in Ukraine may still be distant. But what matters is that the process has begun. These negotiations will not only shape Ukraine’s future but could also redefine the balance of power in international security.

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Policy brief

Hamid Zarei

2025-08-14

Executive Summary

Following structural shifts in Iran’s security and military architecture after the twelve-day war, Tehran appears to be recalibrating its regional approach to reflect evolving geopolitical realities and a more pragmatic framework for securing national interests.

The appointment of Ali Larijani as Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council (SNSC), alongside his role as the Supreme Leader’s representative, signals the integration of moderate conservative figures into the execution of a revised regional strategy. His recent visits to Iraq and Lebanon form part of this recalibration, aimed at influencing regional security arrangements, with indirect implications for future engagement with Turkey and Saudi Arabia.

Key Findings

Strategic Personnel Deployment Larijani’s political credentials and dual authority position him as a high-impact envoy in reshaping Iran’s regional security policy. His alignment with moderate conservative currents, such as those represented by former President Hassan Rouhani, suggests a blended approach of ideological continuity and pragmatic diplomacy. Regional Outreach Focus Iraq and Lebanon were prioritised over Syria in Larijani’s latest diplomatic tour, indicating a phased approach to regional re-engagement. Anticipated future visits to Turkey and Saudi Arabia could serve as precursors to broader regional coordination, especially on the Syrian file. Iraq’s Internal Security Debate The pending legislation to integrate the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) into Iraq’s armed forces remains contentious. Tehran may be seeking to shape Baghdad’s decision-making in ways that preserve a parallel armed capability, despite Washington’s stated opposition. Economic Influence of Persian Gulf Arab States Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the UAE have increased their economic footprint in Iraq via large-scale investments, leveraging capital as a tool of political influence. This economic trend could reshape Iraq’s strategic alignment, indirectly affecting Tehran’s influence. Underlying Objective Beyond formal agreements—such as the signing of the Iran–Iraq security MoU—Tehran’s primary goal appears to be slowing or obstructing the disarmament of allied armed groups in Iraq and Lebanon.

Implications

For Iran: The approach indicates a preference for indirect influence through high-level diplomatic engagement and strategic alliances, while managing post-war pressures. For Iraq: The PMF integration debate will remain a flashpoint for competing foreign interests—Tehran’s, Washington’s, and those of Gulf capitals. For the Region: The Persian Gulf Arab states’ growing economic engagement could complicate Iran’s ability to sustain influence in Iraq without adjusting its economic toolkit. For Security Dynamics: The disarmament of non-state actors could still advance by late 2025, unless disrupted by shifts in the identified accelerants.

Potential Accelerants for Disarmament

Resolution of the Gaza conflict; Convergence/divergence in Moscow–Washington positions on global security, especially Ukraine; Expansion of “mosaic” cross-border economic projects; Initiation of a structured Iran–US/EU diplomatic track; Stabilisation and consolidation of central authority in Syria.

Conclusion

Larijani’s Iraq–Lebanon tour represents a deliberate test of Tehran’s updated regional playbook—anchored in selective engagement, layered diplomacy, and calculated resistance to external pressures for security sector reforms. While diplomatically successful in optics and signalling, the long-term efficacy will depend on the interplay of Iraq’s internal politics, Gulf economic penetration, and broader regional security realignments.

Kurds region capacity

1. Introduction

The Syrian Kurds—particularly the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and the Autonomous Administration of North and Northeast Syria—are among the key political, security, and economic actors in the country. An agreement between the central government in Damascus and the Kurds could not only prevent the continuation of geographical fragmentation but also strengthen and stabilize governance capacity.

2. Political Dimension: Preventing Fragmentation and Governance Models

The Iraqi federalism model, which has granted the Kurdistan Region of Iraq a prominent role in controlling fossil fuel resources, is supported by Europe, the United States, Arab states, and Israel. Only Turkey, due to geopolitical concerns and fears of strengthening its own Kurdish population’s aspirations, strongly opposes this model. An agreement with the Kurds could reinforce national cohesion and prevent the continuation of parallel governance structures.

3. Geo-economic Dimension: Oil and Gas Resources of Syrian Kurdistan

Syrian Kurdistan hosts most of the country’s oil and gas resources, especially in Al-Hasakah province (Rmeilan and Sweidiya fields) and Deir ez-Zor (Al-Omar and Al-Shaddadi fields). According to pre-war estimates, Syria had about 2.5 billion barrels of proven oil reserves, with the majority located in the northeast【BP, 2011】. Before 2011, this region produced around 380,000 to 400,000 barrels of crude oil per day, most of it from fields currently under Kurdish control【EIA, 2010】. Natural gas is also present, albeit in smaller quantities, but with infrastructure development, it could meet domestic demand and enable exports.

4. Geographical Position and Energy Export Routes

Proximity to the borders of Iraq and Turkey provides a prime location for connecting to pipelines and export routes. The region sits at the crossroads of potential future pipeline routes that could connect to Mediterranean ports or Turkey. The Kurdistan Region of Iraq’s experience with the Ceyhan pipeline illustrates how such infrastructure can become a significant source of revenue.

5. Security and Geopolitical Considerations

Cooperation between Damascus and the Kurds could strengthen security along the borders with Turkey and Iraq, while preventing the resurgence of extremist groups like ISIS【ICG, 2020】

6. Conclusion

Reaching an agreement with the Syrian Kurds is a strategic necessity for political, security, and economic reasons. Such an agreement could:

Prevent territorial fragmentation; Activate Syria’s economic and export potential; Reduce dependence on foreign powers.

Point:

Without such an agreement, the vast energy potential of Syrian Kurdistan may remain untapped or fall under the control of external actors, seriously hindering the country’s reconstruction and stabilization.

References

BP Statistical Review of World Energy, 2011. U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA), Syria Country Analysis Brief, 2010. International Crisis Group (ICG), Avoiding a Return to War in Northeast Syria, 2020. Chatham House, Syria’s Oil and Gas: Untapped Potential in the Northeast, 2019. Carnegie Middle East Center, The Politics of Syrian Kurdistan, 2021.

Hamid Zarei

Comprehensive Policy Report – August 12, 2025

1) Executive Summary

This report connects the Amman and Paris diplomatic tracks on Syria and assesses Türkiye and key Arab states’ stances in light of US and EU involvement. The Amman track focuses on immediate stabilization in Suwayda and early reconstruction; the Paris track targets national-level political transition and de-escalation (including U.S.-mediated outreach to Israel). Türkiye prioritizes countering Kurdish autonomy and border security; Arab states emphasize reintegration of Syria into the Arab sphere and leveraging reconstruction to limit Iranian influence. The US aims to sustain de-escalation and prevent an ISIS resurgence while shaping the transition; the EU (led by France) seeks a coordinated political framework and sanctions policy review to unlock reconstruction.

2) Timeline & Factual Anchors (July–August 2025)

• Jul 24–25, Paris: U.S.-mediated talks; Syrian, U.S., and French officials hold ‘frank’ discussions on Syria’s transition and de-escalation.
• Aug 9, Paris: Reports that Damascus will not attend meetings with the SDF in Paris, casting doubt on integration talks.
• Aug 12, Amman: Syria, the U.S., and Jordan agree to work toward a lasting truce in Suwayda and discuss reconstruction; formation of a working group reported.
• Context: Continued scrutiny over violence in Suwayda; reconstruction needs estimated in the hundreds of billions; EU sanctions debate and French advocacy for review earlier in 2025.

3) The Two-Track Architecture

Amman Track – ‘Stabilize the Ground’: Focused on consolidating the Suwayda ceasefire, minority protection, humanitarian access, and early recovery. Objective is to demonstrate tangible stability to build political confidence.
Paris Track – ‘Build the Structure’: Focused on national-level political transition, inclusion/normalization issues, de-escalation (including U.S.-mediated contacts), and the question of integrating autonomous forces (e.g., SDF) into state structures.

4) How Amman Feeds Paris (and Vice Versa)

• Grounded Legitimacy: Local stability successes in Suwayda (Amman) provide credibility for national transition claims (Paris).
• Sequencing: Security guarantees and humanitarian relief precede constitutional and force-integration questions.
• Working Mechanisms: A trilateral working group (Amman) can supply data/benchmarks to Paris negotiators.
• Confidence-Building: Reduced violence and aid access lower the political cost of compromise in Paris.

5) Türkiye and Arab States: Core Positions

Türkiye:
• Red lines on Kurdish autonomy/SDF; insistence on border security; preference for rapid deconfliction arrangements.
• Willingness to trade economic openings for security concessions; coordination/deconfliction with Russia continues; NATO ties constrain options.
Arab States (Jordan, Saudi Arabia, UAE, Egypt – positions vary):
• Reintegration of Syria into Arab structures to dilute extra-regional leverage; preference for sovereign control and territorial integrity.
• Use of reconstruction finance as leverage for security reforms and political inclusion; priority on southern stabilization to protect borders (esp. Jordan).

6) US and EU Roles

United States:
• Mediation on de-escalation (including reported Israel–Syria humanitarian discussions linked to Suwayda).
• Security focus on ISIS containment and preventing regional spillover; support for structured political transition.
European Union / France:
• Paris diplomacy to align political transition with European consensus; debate on calibrating sanctions to enable humanitarian and early recovery funding.
• Interest in predictable security to unlock EU instruments and private investment, contingent on governance benchmarks.

7) Convergence / Divergence Map

Convergences:
• All parties prefer de-escalation in Suwayda; preventing ISIS resurgence; enabling humanitarian access; and a sovereign, territorially unified Syria.
• Broad interest in unlocking reconstruction subject to political/security benchmarks.
Frictions:
• Türkiye vs. decentralization models involving SDF; timelines for Turkish military footprint normalization.
• Arab capitals’ appetite for political normalization vs. conditions to curtail external (especially Iranian) influence.
• EU/US sanctions calibration vs. demands for faster reconstruction inflows from regional investors.

8) Scenarios (2025–2027)

A) Managed Pragmatism (Most Likely):
Amman quietly expands to other hotspots; Paris locks in a stepwise political framework; Türkiye accepts limited local governance arrangements with strict security guarantees; Arab funders back pilot reconstruction tied to verifiable stability metrics.
B) Transactional Fragmentation:
Security holds in some zones but political integration stalls; episodic Turkish–SDF tensions spike; EU sanctions remain tight, constraining reconstruction finance.
C) Compact Breakthrough (Low Probability, High Impact):
A broad agreement aligns decentralization, force integration, and sanctions relief; major reconstruction flows begin with robust monitoring.

9) Policy Options & Recommendations

For Amman Track Stakeholders (Jordan–Syria–US):
• Formalize the working group with public metrics (aid access hours, incident counts, detainee processing times).
• Build a Suwayda Stabilization Package: localized policing support, hospital protection, Druze community liaisons, and monitored corridors.
For Paris Track Stakeholders (Syria–US–France/EU):
• Sequence political steps to concrete field benchmarks from Amman; de-risk early sanctions calibration via a humanitarian carve-out registry.
• Launch an Integration Dialogue: explore security-sector models for phased incorporation of autonomous forces under unified command.
For Türkiye and Arab States:
• Establish a Türkiye–Arab consultative forum on Syria to harmonize border security, refugee return standards, and counter-smuggling.
• Agree on a ‘Decentralization-with-Guardrails’ framework that preserves sovereignty while addressing local governance needs.
For US/EU:
• Sustain mediation (including any humanitarian corridor arrangements) and tie assistance to measurable stability outcomes.
• Prepare a sanctions roadmap linked to verifiable de-escalation and protection-of-civilians commitments.

Annex: Reference Notes 

• AP: Syria, US and Jordan commit to lasting truce in wake of Suwayda clashes (Aug 12, 2025).
• Reuters: Syria–US–France ‘frank’ talks in Paris on transition (Jul 25, 2025).
• Reuters: Syrian–Israeli de-escalation discussion in Paris (Jul 24, 2025).
• Xinhua: Amman trilateral on Suwayda ceasefire (Aug 12–13, 2025).
• Reuters: Damascus says it won’t attend Paris meetings with SDF (Aug 9, 2025).
• Reuters: Macron/EU sanctions review remarks (May 7, 2025).

The recent agreement between Baku and Yerevan, mediated by the United States, has sent significant shockwaves through the region and is set to shape upcoming developments affecting the interests of both regional and extra-regional actors.

In this context, the definition of interests and the threats posed by this agreement are perceived differently—and in some cases, in direct opposition—by Moscow and Tehran. While Moscow has cautiously welcomed the agreement, Tehran views it as a serious threat to its national security and a significant shift in regional geopolitical positions.

Moscow’s approach can be understood as a continuation of the Kremlin’s strategy of “positive balancing” toward developments in the Middle East, the Caucasus, and Central Asia. Overall, it can be assessed that the Zangezur Agreement serves Russia’s interests in engaging with both the U.S. and Turkey, while placing Tehran in yet another difficult geopolitical position in the region.

In this regard, Iran has realized that it cannot rely on Russia and China to safeguard its interests or counter existing and potential threats. China is mentioned here because it is pursuing the strengthening of its economic and political position in the Middle East, the Caucasus, and Central Asia—and in this regard, Beijing has welcomed the agreement. The main reason for Beijing’s positive stance is the opportunity it creates to further develop the Middle Corridor toward Europe.

Therefore, based on statements and positions expressed by Tehran, it is evident that Iranian officials view this agreement as being strongly at odds with Iran’s national interests and security.

Possible Scenarios for Tehran’s Response (with estimated probabilities):

Tehran and Moscow jointly act to contain U.S. presence and neutralize the agreement. Probability: 10% Reason for low probability: Moscow will likely maintain its strategic balancing approach, which is welcomed by Turkey and Beijing. Iran and Russia pursue separate strategies, with Tehran continuing its anti-agreement rhetoric and threats, though ultimately failing to inflict damage on the agreement. Tehran’s disruptive actions remain limited and are unlikely to have meaningful impact. In the meantime, Tehran might attempt to persuade China and Russia to pressure Turkey into allowing a branch of the Middle Corridor to pass through northwestern Iran. However, since the Middle Corridor enjoys Beijing’s full support, Iran is unlikely to complicate matters by creating friction with either Beijing or Moscow. Probability: Over 80% Disagreement between Tehran and Moscow (and consequently Beijing) escalates to severe tensions. Probability: Near zero Reason: Tehran fully understands its own position—and that of others—on the new regional chessboard and will avoid creating new threats.

2025-08-10

Although the Syrian Kurds are considered U.S. allies, Turkey opposes applying Iraq’s federal model to Syria. This stance constitutes a major obstacle to building unity in Syria.

Looking at the case of Iraq after Saddam’s fall, it appears that the U.S. and Europe support Iraq’s federal model.

At the same time, given its geographic position and proximity to the Kurds of Iraq and Syria, Turkey cannot accept the strengthening of autonomous Kurds along its borders with its own Kurdish population.

This situation poses a significant challenge to achieving lasting peace in Syria. The key question is how the United States will step in as a mediator and find a solution to this dilemma.

8 August

Background

On August 8, 2025, Azerbaijan and Armenia signed a landmark peace agreement in Washington, D.C., under U.S. mediation. One of the central elements of the deal is the creation of the Zangezur Corridor, connecting mainland Azerbaijan to Nakhchivan via Armenian territory, and further linking to Türkiye.

The Middle Corridor (Trans-Caspian International Transport Route) is a strategic east–west trade route connecting China to Europe via Central Asia, the Caspian Sea, the South Caucasus, and Türkiye.

Key Findings

Direct Connection to the Middle Corridor Through the Zangezur Corridor, Armenia will be physically linked to the main Middle Corridor route. This opens the possibility of transit flows passing through Armenian territory for the first time in decades. Integration into Regional Logistics Border openings with Azerbaijan and Türkiye will allow Armenia to join the Caucasus transport network. New rail and road connections could integrate Armenia into east–west trade supply chains. Economic and Geopolitical Gains Transit revenues, port and logistics services, and increased trade potential. Improved geopolitical relevance, reducing Armenia’s isolation from regional projects. Challenges and Risks The main Middle Corridor flow still passes through the Baku–Tbilisi–Kars line, limiting Armenia’s role unless it upgrades infrastructure. Regional competition among Türkiye, Iran, and Russia could influence the utilization of Armenian routes.

Conclusion

The Azerbaijan–Armenia peace agreement represents a strategic opportunity for Yerevan to enter the Middle Corridor network. While the deal moves Armenia from the periphery to a potential transit player, achieving a central role will require substantial investment, security guarantees, and multilateral coordination.

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Executive Summary

Following the withdrawal of the United States and NATO forces from Afghanistan, Moscow has gradually shifted its approach, treating Afghanistan not as a zone of conflict but as a geopolitical grey zone — one in which it can exert flexible influence without long-term entanglements. Russia’s engagement with the Taliban regime, including potential political recognition, reflects a multi-layered strategy driven by regional security, competition with the West, and strategic autonomy within the Eurasian order.

1. Strategic Context: Why Afghanistan Matters to Russia

Afghanistan sits at the crossroads of Russia’s extended neighborhood and key security zones (Central Asia, South Asia, and Iran). Since the Soviet withdrawal in 1989, Russia has avoided deep military involvement in the country, yet it remains deeply concerned about:

Spillover of terrorism into Central Asia Narcotics trafficking Refugee flows and political instability Influence of rival powers (e.g., the U.S., China, Türkiye and India)

With the vacuum left by the West, Russia sees an opportunity to reassert strategic weight — but through low-cost, flexible methods.

2. The Logic of Flexibility: Russia’s Geopolitical Calculus

a. Low-Cost, High-Leverage Engagement

Russia’s relations with the Taliban are primarily transactional. Moscow avoids formal alliances or military deployment, opting instead for:

Diplomatic contacts via informal channels Hosting Taliban representatives in Moscow Intelligence-sharing with regional partners

b. Afghanistan as a Tool for Pressure Diplomacy

Russia can use engagement with the Taliban as a geopolitical message to the West:

Undermining Western legitimacy in Afghanistan Projecting itself as an alternative regional power broker Using Afghanistan as a bargaining chip in broader negotiations over Ukraine, NATO, and sanctions

c. Outflanking China and the SCO Balance

Though China is more focused on economic engagement, Russia maintains a political-security edge in Central Asia. By stepping ahead of Beijing in recognizing or normalizing relations with the Taliban, Moscow protects its regional primacy within the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) framework.

3. Afghanistan as a Containment Buffer

For Russia, Afghanistan is not only a space of influence, but also a containment zone:

Counterterrorism buffer: Preventing the spread of ISIS-K and other jihadist threats into Central Asia Securing the southern perimeter: Protecting CSTO partners like Tajikistan from destabilization Managing refugee and narcotics flows through controlled engagement.

4. Tactical Ambiguity as Strategy

Russia benefits from ambiguity and flexibility. Unlike its policy in Ukraine or Syria, Moscow:

Maintains noncommittal recognition of the Taliban Engages without investing deeply Avoids being drawn into Afghanistan’s internal conflicts

This approach allows Russia to maneuver diplomatically while avoiding the costs that burdened the U.S. and NATO.

Conclusion

While Moscow is unlikely to pursue deep alliance-building with the Taliban, it will continue to treat Afghanistan as a geopolitical swing state — useful in regional containment, global diplomacy, and strategic signaling, particularly in a world increasingly shaped by post-Western power competition.