Policy brief
Hamid Zarei
2025-08-14
Executive Summary
Following structural shifts in Iran’s security and military architecture after the twelve-day war, Tehran appears to be recalibrating its regional approach to reflect evolving geopolitical realities and a more pragmatic framework for securing national interests.
The appointment of Ali Larijani as Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council (SNSC), alongside his role as the Supreme Leader’s representative, signals the integration of moderate conservative figures into the execution of a revised regional strategy. His recent visits to Iraq and Lebanon form part of this recalibration, aimed at influencing regional security arrangements, with indirect implications for future engagement with Turkey and Saudi Arabia.
Key Findings
Strategic Personnel Deployment Larijani’s political credentials and dual authority position him as a high-impact envoy in reshaping Iran’s regional security policy. His alignment with moderate conservative currents, such as those represented by former President Hassan Rouhani, suggests a blended approach of ideological continuity and pragmatic diplomacy. Regional Outreach Focus Iraq and Lebanon were prioritised over Syria in Larijani’s latest diplomatic tour, indicating a phased approach to regional re-engagement. Anticipated future visits to Turkey and Saudi Arabia could serve as precursors to broader regional coordination, especially on the Syrian file. Iraq’s Internal Security Debate The pending legislation to integrate the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) into Iraq’s armed forces remains contentious. Tehran may be seeking to shape Baghdad’s decision-making in ways that preserve a parallel armed capability, despite Washington’s stated opposition. Economic Influence of Persian Gulf Arab States Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the UAE have increased their economic footprint in Iraq via large-scale investments, leveraging capital as a tool of political influence. This economic trend could reshape Iraq’s strategic alignment, indirectly affecting Tehran’s influence. Underlying Objective Beyond formal agreements—such as the signing of the Iran–Iraq security MoU—Tehran’s primary goal appears to be slowing or obstructing the disarmament of allied armed groups in Iraq and Lebanon.
Implications
For Iran: The approach indicates a preference for indirect influence through high-level diplomatic engagement and strategic alliances, while managing post-war pressures. For Iraq: The PMF integration debate will remain a flashpoint for competing foreign interests—Tehran’s, Washington’s, and those of Gulf capitals. For the Region: The Persian Gulf Arab states’ growing economic engagement could complicate Iran’s ability to sustain influence in Iraq without adjusting its economic toolkit. For Security Dynamics: The disarmament of non-state actors could still advance by late 2025, unless disrupted by shifts in the identified accelerants.
Potential Accelerants for Disarmament
Resolution of the Gaza conflict; Convergence/divergence in Moscow–Washington positions on global security, especially Ukraine; Expansion of “mosaic” cross-border economic projects; Initiation of a structured Iran–US/EU diplomatic track; Stabilisation and consolidation of central authority in Syria.
Conclusion
Larijani’s Iraq–Lebanon tour represents a deliberate test of Tehran’s updated regional playbook—anchored in selective engagement, layered diplomacy, and calculated resistance to external pressures for security sector reforms. While diplomatically successful in optics and signalling, the long-term efficacy will depend on the interplay of Iraq’s internal politics, Gulf economic penetration, and broader regional security realignments.
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