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The recent agreement between Baku and Yerevan, mediated by the United States, has sent significant shockwaves through the region and is set to shape upcoming developments affecting the interests of both regional and extra-regional actors.

In this context, the definition of interests and the threats posed by this agreement are perceived differently—and in some cases, in direct opposition—by Moscow and Tehran. While Moscow has cautiously welcomed the agreement, Tehran views it as a serious threat to its national security and a significant shift in regional geopolitical positions.

Moscow’s approach can be understood as a continuation of the Kremlin’s strategy of “positive balancing” toward developments in the Middle East, the Caucasus, and Central Asia. Overall, it can be assessed that the Zangezur Agreement serves Russia’s interests in engaging with both the U.S. and Turkey, while placing Tehran in yet another difficult geopolitical position in the region.

In this regard, Iran has realized that it cannot rely on Russia and China to safeguard its interests or counter existing and potential threats. China is mentioned here because it is pursuing the strengthening of its economic and political position in the Middle East, the Caucasus, and Central Asia—and in this regard, Beijing has welcomed the agreement. The main reason for Beijing’s positive stance is the opportunity it creates to further develop the Middle Corridor toward Europe.

Therefore, based on statements and positions expressed by Tehran, it is evident that Iranian officials view this agreement as being strongly at odds with Iran’s national interests and security.

Possible Scenarios for Tehran’s Response (with estimated probabilities):

Tehran and Moscow jointly act to contain U.S. presence and neutralize the agreement. Probability: 10% Reason for low probability: Moscow will likely maintain its strategic balancing approach, which is welcomed by Turkey and Beijing. Iran and Russia pursue separate strategies, with Tehran continuing its anti-agreement rhetoric and threats, though ultimately failing to inflict damage on the agreement. Tehran’s disruptive actions remain limited and are unlikely to have meaningful impact. In the meantime, Tehran might attempt to persuade China and Russia to pressure Turkey into allowing a branch of the Middle Corridor to pass through northwestern Iran. However, since the Middle Corridor enjoys Beijing’s full support, Iran is unlikely to complicate matters by creating friction with either Beijing or Moscow. Probability: Over 80% Disagreement between Tehran and Moscow (and consequently Beijing) escalates to severe tensions. Probability: Near zero Reason: Tehran fully understands its own position—and that of others—on the new regional chessboard and will avoid creating new threats.

2025-08-10